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In the winter of 1889-90, Secretary of the Navy 
Benjamin Franklin Tracy altered the basic naval strategy of 
the United States, a change unique in American history. 
Since the Revolutionary War the Navy had been devoted to 
protecting the coasts and raiding ene.rny co.rn.rnerce, although 
the emphasis of this policy had varied. In the ·1aaos a 
group of young naval officers, who advocated a fleet in the 
style of the European powers, advanced to co.rn.rnand ranks. 
Two of their leaders, Admiral Stephen B. Luce and Captain 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, convinced Tracy to begin the con-
struction of a squadron of American capital ships, a course 
last seriously contemplated during the War of ·15·12. ·1 Since 
that winter, the capital ship has evolved fro.rn battleships 
and armored cruisers to nuclear aircraft carriers and 
ballistic .missile submarines, but American naval policy has 
remained firmly centered on the battlefleet. 
The complete victory of Tracy's battleships at the 
Battle of Santiago apparently vindicated this new policy, 
but only seven years later, the Navy's unwavering adherence 
to the capital ship strategy caused it to become increas-
ingly impotent as a consideration in international strat-
egy. In October 1905 Great Britain began the construction 
of HMS Qreadnought, a battleship of unprecedented power and 
expense, which substantially raised the prerequisites of a 
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warship of capital ship status. The United States Navy had 
fumbled an opportunity to gain a similar technological 
breakthrough and then opted to build dreadnoughts only 
after prolonged debate. In a critical error, the General 
Board, the closest equivalent to a naval general staff, 
decided merely to upgrade the Navy's strategic goals and 
policies to the new standard.2 
Continuing advances in naval technology and increasing 
international competition would raise this criterion every 
year until 1922. The spiraling expenses of building and 
maintaining a fleet of these leviathans forced every major 
power to sacrifice other naval necessities, but none more 
so than the United States. In April 1917, the Navy could 
muster only a dozen dreadnoughts and twenty-seven destroy-
ers ready for service.3 This was a force capable of 
daunting Japan, however, if either of the European al-
liances won a decisive victory it would be unable to 
defend the national interests. The battlefleet was quite 
extravagant for its usual task of maintaining the informal 
empire in the Caribbean, and it had proved ineffective at 
asserting other foreign policy objectives after the return 
of the Great White Fleet. 
Previous commentators only superficially have examined 
the appropriateness of Mahan's Capital Ship Strategy to the 
strategic position of the United States in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century. Most naval historians 
have viewed the period as a necessary phase in the progres-
sive e'lolution of AJTJerican seapo1...ier t.o global conuns1nd of 
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the oceans.4 Naval strategists when turning to history 
have concentrated on the baleful effects on Imperial 
Germany of her naval leader's excessive devotion to and 
limited understanding of Mahan's principles.5 Alfred Vagts 
has proposed the construction of a great monument to 
Mahan with the inscription "He taught the Germans the i,..1rong 
lessons."6 David Trask and Herwig Helger have noted in 
passing that American naval policy essentially folloJ..Jed the 
same Risk Strategy as the High Seas Fleet.7 Clark G. 
Reynolds conspicuously did not include a capital ship 
strategy as a viable option for an ambitious naval power of 
middle rank.a The one clear lesson in Mahan's historical 
writings was that England paid any price for the destruct-
ion of her naval rivals. The United States avoided this 
fate because of the fortuitously simultaneous emergence of 
German naval power, and the fortuitous pyrrhic victory of 
Great Britain in the First World War. 
I contend that the United States• pursuit of a Capital 
Ship was flawed from the outset, despite its auspicious 
beginnings, and that it became potentially disastrous 
through the Navy's inability to mount a creditable response 
to the Dreadnought Revolution. As noted above, other 
writers have alluded to this conclusion, but this research 
in its support is original. 
A Law of History may be ventured; masters candidates 
accumulate many debts. I should like to thank Dr. Joseph 
Stout, Jr. for venturing far from his borderlands tn head 
rny committe.=;;, and for toleration of my early acquisition of 
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the writer's habit of not beating any deadlines. Dr. 
Alexander Ospovat has broadened my horizons in the History 
of Science and Technology, and Dr. H. James Henderson has 
stimulated my interest in quantification and the philosophy 
of history. Dr. Richard Rohrs was a great encouragement 
when I was tentatively returning to graduate studies. Dr. 
Ronald Petrin has also taught me a great deal about teach-
ing, and has had the dubious honor of reading many of my 
early drafts. Another Law is that the greatest debts are 
owed to one's spouse. Kim Keziah McKeage has given me 
unfaltering love and support while maintaining her own 
graduate studies. Kim deserves a brevet commission in 
BuCon's Salvage Division. She has suffered more than 
anyone, and now can even describe the operations of the 
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CHAPTER I 
MAHAN'S THEORY OF SEA POWER AND THE 
STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 
In 1884 Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan began teaching 
naval history and strategy at the newly-established Naval 
War College at Newport, Rhode Island. Admiral Stephen B. 
Luce had selected Mahan to fill the most critical billet 
at his pet project based on his hopes that Mahan could 
make naval warfare into a science. Mahan had had a less 
than distinguished career to that point, but his father, 
Dennis Hart Mahan, had introduced the strategic and 
tactical system of the French General Henri Jomini to the 
generation of West Pointers who would oversee the bloody 
battles of the Civil War. Alfred apparently never read 
his father's works, but he did name his dog 'Jomini,' and 
succeeded beyond Luce's greatest expectations.1 
In his research for his new post, Mahan came to 
believe that naval superiority was the most critical 
factor in the wars of great powers, and applying Jomini to 
naval warfare, he derived the "Theory of Sea Power."2 
This became the de facto basis of American naval policy 
five years later, and since has been elevated to the realm 
of gospel. The Navy, and most historians, have seen a 
causal relationship between the adoption of Mahan's 
principles and the United States' establishment of global 
naval hegemony by 1945. That may be, but the Theory of 
Sea Power, in its specific application--the capital ship 
strategy--was not universally successful and in Mahan's 
lifetime it becar11e increasingly incompatible with American 
national interests. In the first two decades of the 
twentieth century this new strategy became unnecessarily 
perilous for the United States because of the failure of 
the Navy to respond adequately to the introduction of 
economic and technological warfare into the considerations 
of national strategy and naval policy brought by the 
Dreadnought revolution. 
In the later decades of the nineteenth century the 
United States began to abandon the spirit of isolation 
exwmplified in the original version of the Monroe Doctrine 
and to take an active role in world affairs, a role that 
inevitably involved the United States Navy. This new 
spirit has had various explanations--a need to export 
surplus capital, the closing of the frontier, and even the 
"natural cycles" of empire--yet from the perspective of 
the Navy it was a relatively sudden awakening after much 
post-bellur11 neglect. Given the oceans separating the 
United States from the other major powers, the nascent 
American strength had to be expressed primarily at sea. 
In the United States' maritime tradition dating back to 
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the Revolutionary War, the Navy had patrolled an informal 
trading empire in peace, and in war sought to protect the 
nation's coasts and to disrupt enemy commerce. In '1889, 
the United States abandoned this customary .. guerre de 
course" naval strategy which relied on the near invulnera-
bility of the country's vast interior and its immense 
industrial potential for Mahan•s assertive new one. 
The reconstruction of the United States Navy began in 
1879, and gained Congressional sanction in 1883 with a 
customary emphasis upon the defense of the nation's coasts 
and the destruction of enemy shipping.3 The greatest 
problem was that the American merchant marine had not 
recovered from the depredations of Confederate commerce-
raiders, and the Union's world leadership in naval technol-
ogy in the 1860s had not been maintained. By the early 
1880s the United States lacked the industrial potential to 
build modern warships, a capacity that private industry 
would not undertake without government guarantees of 
ongoing naval construction.4 Several nominally Civil 
War-vintage monitors were reconstructed, and several fast 
cruisers built to emulate the CSS Alabama, but American 
naval ambitions remained those of a second-class power. 
The "guerre de course" strategy of denying victory to a 
superior foe, rather than establishing one's own mastery, 
received a classical expression in the first programs of 
the "New Navy." 
Mahan's strongest objection to traditional American 
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naval policy was that the increased pace of modern war 
brought by steam power made a strategy of slowly wearing 
down the enemy untenable, and that modern warships could 
not operate without safe bases, as swarms of privateers 
once had done. The "guerre de course" would no longer deny 
an enemy the use of the sea soon enough to be decisive. An 
opponent's fleet could not be allowed to institute an 
effective blockade, and launch amphibious attacks at will 
as the Union Fleet had done in the Civil War; it would 
have to be fought. The only effective means of fighting a 
fleet was with one's own battlefleet composed of capital 
ships, the primary naval combattant of any given era. 
Mahan also strongly believed in the inevitability of war 
between the powers, primarily due to their natural economic 
competition for survival and expasion. This later belief 
had a strong and negative influence on the Navy's strategic 
planning, but Mahan•s primary lesson.was that a nation must 
possess a battlefleet stronger than that of any rival.5 
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Franklin Tracy began 
this re-direction of the Navy under the influence of Luce's 
lobbying and a pre-publication copy of Mahan's The In-
fluence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783.6 On assuming 
office, Tracy summoned the McCallum Policy Board to settle 
the conflict between traditionalists and modernizers in the 
Navy. The Policy Board came out very strongly for Sea 
Power, calling for a massive fleet of capital ships at a 
time when the United States had not completed any. Despite 
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the negative political reaction to the Board's ambitions, 
Tracy gained Congressional approval for the construction of 
the first three battleships and formed the .. Squadron of 
Evolution" to experiment with fleet tactics.7 By the end 
of his term, the increasing tensions with Spain and the 
success of Mahan's writings had led to a general acceptance 
of the Theory of Sea Power.a 
Mahan's success as a popularizer rested largely on 
three very marketable ideas: that the United States would 
lose its isolation throught the construction of an Isthmian 
Canal, that the country's ports were vulnerable to attack 
with deterrance being cheaper than ransom, and that the 
United States' destiny was not bounded by the American 
continent.9 The way to resolve all three of these problems 
was a powerful American fleet. Mahan's greatest impact was 
as an essayist, as his books likely were much more widely 
cited than read, for the Influence of Sea Power on History 
was rough going even by the standards of the time. As with 
most major strategists, Mahan's writings were so extensive 
that correct quotes can be found for any contingency. 
However, if the United States Navy's application of his 
principles showed too much devotion and too little under-
standing, this was not a course that Mahan attempted to 
correct in his popular writings, and he may be judged 
accordingly. 
The new battlefleets implemented Mahan's strategy 
during the Spanish-American War with deceptively easy 
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success. Spain's fleets were quickly contained by blockade 
or swiftly destroyed, giving the United States free use of 
the seas for invasion and trade while indirectly defending 
the American coast. This textbook demonstration of Mahan's 
principles further popularized·thern with civilians and 
elevated them to the realrn of dogrna within the Navy.10 
Accordin_g to the Theory of Sea Power the United St.ates was 
now established as a rna.ritirne power and to remain compet-
itive the nation would have to increase its battlefleet 
beyond the major increases ordered during the war.11 
This was a relatively easy program to sell to Congress as 
it promised quick and easy victories well away from the 
homeland. 1 2 
The next President, Theodore Roosevelt, probably had 
become an advocate of Sea Power even before Mahan's 
influence, and he possessed a more subtle understanding of 
the political uses of a navy.13 Roosevelt's first inter-
national adventure came with the Venezuelan debt crisis of 
·1902-1903, when he sharply protested the German blockade. 
Roosevelt used the incident to persuade Congress to 
continue the American naval build-up which was important 
in convincing both England and Geramny that the ambitions 
of the United States could be dealt with only after a 
resolution of the European situation.14 This was all lost 
on the Navy which expected an irnrnanent war with Germany; 
as the rising economic powers they would have to fight to 
determine who would challenge England.15 
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The Navy ~~as dismayed to discover that Roosevelt 
intended to cut back on this rapid expansion once the 
diplomatic mini-crisis had ended. The Prsident had 
determined that the United States had the industrial 
capacity to begin the construction of twelve battleships 
in a year and to complete them in two, if it were absolute-
ly essential.16 In a six-year burst of effort the United 
States Navy was about to become the second most powerful 
in the world, and the diplomatic situation was such that 
none of the great powers could concentrate all of their 
resources against the United States for fear of their 
greedy neighbors. The United States Navy had achieved the 
"risk fleet" that Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was atterr1pting 
to build, without success.17 
In 1903 the Navy's General Board revised the recom-
mendations of the Policy Board of 1889 upwards from 
thirty-five to forty-eight capital ships (the long standing 
rumor that this number was desirable because it provided 
for one ship per state has never been silenced).18 This 
unofficial program became the basic outline of American 
naval policy until the United States' entry into the 
First World War.19 The Board desired a battlefleet second 
only to that of Great Britain to be kept in the Caribbean 
for use against Germany or later Japan, whom the Board 
deemed to be the only probable future foes.20 This 
strategy had already begun to unravel. 
In 1900 foreign naval architects had realized that 
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the most efficient JTieans of arming a warship was i-1 i th guns 
of a single caliber, and gunnery experts saw that this 
would improve their art.21 Two American officers, William 
S. Sims and Homer C. Poundstone, were arnoung the first to 
realize the implications of combining these ideas, impli.c-
ations that would lead to the Dreadnought.22 Sims decided 
that this would be an excellent issue around which to 
develop his life-long quest for organizational reform in 
the Navy.2a The Navy was then divided into seven essent-
ially independent Bureaus with ill-defined and often 
overlapping spheres of responsibilities. In ·1904 the 
United States Navy had the technical capacity and the 
military theory to build its first all-big-gun battleships 
of the Michigan class, ships that actually were not 
completed unti 1 '191 0. :24 These ships were in fer ior to the 
English Dreadnought, for the United States was behind in 
steam turbine technology, but they would'have had no less 
a revolutionary impact on foreign navies.25 This delay 
resulted from internecine quarrels which Sims had stirred, 
and from Mahan' s personal opposition to the nevJ type, 
largely based on theorectical grounds. Sims and Mahan 
would resolve the issue through a debate in the semi-offic-
ial Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute.26 
Sims won because he argued Mahanian theory better than the 
"Prophet" himself. 
Mahan had based his research on eighteenth century 
naval warfare when ships-of-the-line were the capital 
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ships and when there had been little technological innovat-
ion for over a century beforehand, and only an incr~nental 
improvemnt for the ne:xt si:x decades.27 He therefore did 
not consider technology to be an especially important 
aspect of naval warfare, particularly as the perennially 
defeated French usually had better ships than the British. 
By the twentieth century society itself had become technol-
ogical and technical superiority was now one of the few 
attractive options for a small ambitious naval power.2e 
After the Michigans the United States sought to make its 
designs stronger than any contemporaries. This margin was 
very small, though, and the longer building time for 
American battleships, four years versus two to three for 
England and Germany, made this design policy quite inef-
fective.29 The United States was not pursuing this 
strategic option, but Japan had begun to do so; this 
would become only too apparent in the year after Pearl 
Harbor. The leaders of the Navy remembered that the 
Confederate Nav~·s search for technological superiority 
had been a failure, but while these efforts had been 
gallant, they also had been singularly inept.Bo Moreover, 
Mahan rejected the dreadnought as Great Britain had 
rejected the great 'first-rate• ship-of-the-line in the 
Nelson Era--too much of the nation's military resources 
committed to one fragile hull.31 He also sensed how 
disruptive and destabilizing a technological and economic 
arms race would be for his comfortable Victorian civiliz-
g 
ation, but such arguments could not prevail.32 
In 1905 Great Britain laid down HMS Dreadnought, a 
battleship of unprecidented size and power. In the 
mid-1880s the world's navies had largely absorbed the 
Industrial Revolution's innovations: steam power, armor, 
and shell-firing rifled cannons, and the prerequisates 
for capital ship status were increasing slowly.33 Twenty 
years later, the United States Navy was a leader in the 
devolopment of new methods of propulsion and gunnery, but 
Admiral Jackie Fisher's daring decision to use untested 
technologies in the Dreadnought caught the Navy by sur-
prize. 34 After unnecessarily prolonged debate, the navy 
decide to build dreadnoughts too, and made a critical 
error in its decision simply to upgrade its strategic 
policies and goals to this new standard.35 
Continued advances in naval technology and increased 
international tensions raised the criterion for capital 
ship status annually until 1922. The spiralling expenses 
of building and maintaining a battlefleet of these burgeon-
ing leviathans forced every major power to sacrifice other 
naval necessities, but none more so than the United States: 
in April 1917 the Navy could muster only twelve battleships 
with very inadequate numbers of escort and support vessels 
ready for service.36 This was a force inadequate for 
defense against the worst contingencies, hamhanded in the 
task of maintaining the American empire in the Caribbean, 
and 
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disregarded by the United States' friends and foes as a 
factor in diplomacy. There were other factors involved in 
this strategic impotence of the Navy that 1...ias nominally 
the the third most powerful in the world, but the primary 
determinant was the Navy's unwavering and uncritical 
commitment to the capital ship strategy. 
Mahan had maintained that the battlefleet needed to 
be balanced, that is to have adequate subordinate vessels 
for scouting abd support duties, but he did not specify 
whether battleships or auxiliaries should be sacrificed 
first.37 The Navy had a strong lobby within Congress and 
was able to increase its appropriations at a rate quite 
comparable to those of the other powers as the Dreadnought 
escalated the international naval arms race into a fren-
zy.3a Still the increased costs of building and maintain-
ing a dreadnought battlefleet was busting the budget.39 
The Navy determined that auxiliaries could be obtained 
much faster than capital ships in a war so that all else 
could be done without to keep dreadnought construction at 
a two-per-year pace.40 This decision was logically sound, 
but its implementation was atrocious. It would appear 
that once a war seemed immanent that a crash program 
should be begun to balance the fleet, but this did not 
occur in 1914 or 1915. 
In 1916 and 1917 when the Navy had a carte blanche, 
it desired a dozen new capital ships, and would only 
reluctantly consent to suspend their construction to build 
destroyers to meet the crisis of the U-Boat war.41 The 
Navy had built only three cruisers from 1903 to the end of 
tiorld War I, and submarines, in which the United States 
once had a large technological lead, were built only at 
Congressional insistence.42 This budgetary problem 
extended beyond materiel for the Navy did not have enough 
men to man the ships of the Spanish-American War expansion. 
The Navy thus was forced to keep virtually all of its 
second line ships tied up without adequate reserve crews. 
Only the battlefleet was preserved in accordance with 
Mahanian standards of preparedness.43 
The Navy was also left with very limited funds for 
research and development, though there was also a certain 
lack of interest as it knew it already possessed the one 
strategic superweapon.44 The United States had a substan-
tial lead in aviation and submarine technology but this 
received very little encouragement from the Navy. This 
was particularly important for the Navy in the field of 
gunnery. Bradley Fiske had very advanced ideas before the 
Spanish-American War, but he ran into a wall of bureaucra-
tic obstruction, and research in thls field virtually 
ceased.45 At the same time the British Navy was beginning 
to work on a primitive fire-control computer and the 
Germans improved the optics on existing range-finders.46 
When an American squadron arrived to reinforce the Grand 
Fleet in late 1917, the inferiority of the Navy's gunnery 
was qui: te ernbararrassing. 47 Sirris had fought the Navy's 
12 
inertia when his proposals for improved target practice 
fell on deaf ears. He would risk his career to go directly 
to President Roosevelt, but with his success the United 
States' limited ability to produce the great cannons that 
wore out after a hundred rounds became a problem.48 There 
was, of course, no money to increase this industrial 
capacity. 
The American dreadnought battlefleet 1...ias basically 
adequate to fulfill the Navy's self-assigned tasks, but 
these missions reflected a superficial assessment of the 
interests of the United States. The Navy sought to 
overawe Japan and to make potential German adventures 
excessively risky (the General Board feared that the High 
Seas Fleet was secretly aimed at the United States).49 
The acquisition of the Philippines had created a dilemma 
for the United States and Japan, for neither could be 
secure without imperilling the other.50 .8..merican warships 
also had to be able to cruise to the Far East which forced 
American designers to reduce armor, armarnent, and speed. 
The first generation of American battleships had sacrificed 
range for fighting power; a strategy whose effectiveness 
the Germans demonstrated at Jutland. Because of this 
design policy the High Seas Fleet was virtually incapable 
of overseas deployment. The Navy did not consider such 
basic factors in its war plans which made the battlef leet 
inefficient even within its own Mahanian realm. 
The limitations oof the Navy's strategic vision led 
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to the potentially most dire consequences of its dread-
nought policy. The General Board's and Naval War College's 
primary function as strategists was to deal with poten-
tialities so it is not improper to subject them to counter-
factual criticism. The General Board had studies coalition 
warfare, but after the Russo-Japanese War decided that the 
United States Navy would not face a hostile coalition.51 
The Board ignored the possibility of a two-ocean war 
against Japan and a European Power because of Mahan's 
definition of the economic causes of war.52 The growing 
confrontation of the European Alliances made this unlikely 
in the short run, but England and Germany had discarded 
their ambitions in the Americas only because of those 
entanglements.5.3 If either were victorious in a general 
European war, these interests were likely to reawaken, and 
virtually all military experts of the time expected a short 
general war with a clear winner.54 World War I would maim 
all the European belligerents, a result highly favorable to 
American interests, but it was imprudent for the Navy to 
rely on this outcome. It was then in the interest of the 
United States to act to preserve the balance of power. 
Roosevelt realized this, and did intervene in the First 
Moroccan Crisis. The peculiar foreign policies of his 
successors basically preempted this option, but the Navy 
earned no praise by encouraging its detachment from 
American diplomacy. 
The Navy was ready only to face its chosen foes, 
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heedless of Mahan's admonishment to prepare not against 
"the most probable of danger, but the most formidable;" 
but did it not have any alternatives?55 In an era when 
Brazil and Chile acquired dreadnoughts, and Holland and 
Greece attempted to, how should the United States be 
blamed for doing the same? The United States needed to 
build warships if only to maintain technological parity and 
to provide public works projects.56 The Navy succeeded in 
creating a "fleet-in-being," a force that could compromise 
a foe's freedom of action. This was the most that could be 
done without the chance of distracting England's ire from 
Germany. However, the Navy did not intend to keep the 
battlefleet in reserve, but to risk it for quick and 
decisive victory.57 Mahan's expectation of ultra-brief 
modern wars was widely held at the time, but the Royal 
Navy's ineffective bombardment of Alexandria in 1878 
should have suggested the later impotence of Sea Power 
alone against Santiago, Port Arthur, and the Dardenelles. 
Even if wiser counsel employed the battlefleet in its 
proper role--preventing defeat while the nation mobilized--
it was not well suited to this strategy. The United 
States required some form of technological superiority for 
its fleet, and this was available in a design policy aimed 
at higher speeds. Battlecruisers have been disreputable 
since their inception, but a smaller squadron of this type 
of ship Hould have better met American needs. Such an 
option was not likely as Mahan particularly degraded speed 
as a tactical quality, and the savings of one rather than 
two ships a year would not necessarily have gone to the 
Navy.sa A less hypothetical alternative would have been to 
continue to build small battleships like the Michigan~. 
This would have limited the Navy to a less attractive 
"fortress fleet" strategy of coast defense, but the fleet 
would have been far better prepared to execute it. 
Although the United States was striving to achieve an 
active role in world affairs through its Dreadnought 
policy, it built a fleet that was quite passive in the 
Great Game; this was not a sound national strategy.s9 
Fleet Admiral Gorshkov's criticism of Imperial Russia's 
battlefleet can be readily applied to that of the United 
States: 
I ts const1~uction continued to rem a in essent-
ially based on its prestige value to the 
state, ignoring the need ... to possess sea-
power. Therefore, the construction of the 
fleet was of a chance character not pursuing 
specifically defined tasks but only fitting 
its forces to the force of foreign fleets ... 60 
At the base of the prohlem was Mahan's focus on the battle-
fleet, which readily led to the materialist deception that 
only weapons matter.61 A paraphrase of T.E. Lawrence's 
comments to B.H. Liddell Hart regarding Clauswitz is even 
more apt: 
The logical system of [Mahan] is too complete. 
It led astray his disciples--those of them, at 
least, who would rather fight with their arms 
than with their legs ... 62 
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CHAPTER II 
IMPLEMENTING THE CAPITAL SHIP STRATEGY 
IN THE PREDREADNOUGHT ERA 
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy's Policy Board 
of 1889 not only altered the fundamental naval strategy of 
the United States, but also proposed a specific program to 
implement its goals. This plan was somewhat ambitious, 
calling for thirty-five battleships at a time when the 
United States had only the hybrid Maine and Texas under 
construction.1 If approved this would have been the first 
of the Nouvelles, the long-term fleet expansion programs, 
that all of the naval powers except the United States and 
Great Britain adopted before the World War I.2 Congress 
rejected the specific program of the Board with such 
vehemence that Tracy· had to disavm.;i it publicly.=i Although 
lacking official sanction or legal standing, the Policy 
Board's Report served, with minor revisions in 1903 and 
1908, as the touchstone for the Navy's decision making 
before the Firs~ World War.4 
. 
The new Mahanian strategy advanced the United States 
Navy from obscurity to the second most powerful fleet in 
the world in fifteen years. Despite this accomplishment, 
the institutional deficiencies that would lead to the 
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collapse of American naval influence in the early Dread-
nought Era beca1n.e ingrained during these halcyon days. The 
primary problem was the archaic organization of the Navy 
that created a confused process for designing warships, 
encouraged bureaucratic infighting over prerogatives and 
reform, and contributed to the isolation of the Navy's 
leaders from the Congress and the State Department. With 
these obstacles the Navy would not be able to adapt Mahan's 
Theory of Seapower to a factor he had not considered--the 
technological aspect of military competition in the 
twentieth century as embodied by the Dreadnought Revolut-
ion. 
The Navy's conversion to the capital ship strategy had 
been, in part, the results of an internal struggle between 
the modernizing ''Insurgentstt led by Admiral Stephen 
B. Luce, and the old guard of the Civil War Navy. Luce 
succeeded in establishing a new European approach to naval 
warfare, but failed to alter the Bureau system of manage-
ment that dated back to 1842. The Navy was divided into 
seven Bureaus, but the Bureau's responsibilities overlapped 
in the critical areas of strategy, the tactical require-
ments for future warships, and their actual construction.s 
The Bureau of Ordnance was responsible for the ships 
weapons, the Bureau of Steam Engineering controlled 
propulsion systems, and the Bureau of Construction and 
Repair had general supervision over everything else; none 
was answerable for the overall success of a vessel.6 When 
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the Bureaus disagreed among themselves or with the officers 
of the line over a new design, a special board would be 
convened to make a final determination. Such clashes were 
frequent because the Bureaus tended to be bastions for the 
conservative factions of the Navy while the progressive 
elements were in the line, although the line tended to 
follow the latest naval fads.7 
In theory, the Bureau system was controlled and 
directed by the Secretary of the Navy; several factors 
combined to make this civilian leadership ineffective. The 
authority of the executive branch was at a low until 
Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, and Roosevelt continued 
the practice of using the office of the Secretary of the 
Navy as a political reward. Secretaries tended to be 
inexperienced in naval matters and to have short tenures 
that prevented even the well-intentioned from establishing 
command. Tracy was unusually successful for the period. 
The Bureaus also were well insulated by their powerful 
connections in Congress. Thu~ most vital military decis-
ions were left to the transitory special boards, and policy 
was made on an ad hoc basis. 
Tracy succeeded in persuading Congress to approve 
three battleships of the Indiana class, which along with 
earlier armored cruisers, designed as super-AlaJ?ama_s for 
commerce raiding, constituted the United States Navy's 
first, makeshift battlefleet in the Spanish-American 
War. The Indianas got through Congress as ''sea-going coast 
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defense battleships," an indication of the confusion over 
their future roles. There was a clear consensus for 
mounting a very heavy armament on the Indiana class, but 
this required a sacrifice in some other tactical capability 
\ 
and the alternatives were felt to be range or armor.a 
Mahan held that a string of bases could be substituted for 
intrinsic long-range, and that the engagement of opposing 
battlefleets in a proper Nelsonian fight to the death made 
armor a vital consideration.9 The special board called to 
make this decision had little difficulty in opting for a 
very low freeboard, heavy armor, and short range.io This 
was one of the last instances in which the conservative 
Bureaus and progressive line found themselves in accord. 
The fourth American battleship, the Iowa, was an 
enlarged Indiana that caused little controversy, but the 
Kearsarge and Kentucky began an almost unbroken string of 
intra-service quarrels over capital ship design. The 
Bureau of Construction and _Repair ( BuCon) desired the 
mounting of their battery of 8inch guns directly atop the 
main battery turret in a single enlarged "superposed" 
turret, while the Bureau of Ordnance wanted the secondary 
guns in seperate "superimposed" turrets firing over the 
main battery turret.ii The acrimonious dispute over 
superposed turrets lasted until the Dreadnought Era. The 
superposed turret offered significant savings in weight 
v1hich made them very popular with American designers, i-.hi le 
tacticians feared that they made the ships too vulnerable 
to a single penetrating shell, and the line universally 
despised their utility in actual service.12 
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The first battleships of the major wartime expansion 
of the battlefleet, the new Maine class briefly avoided the 
problem, as no foreign power had followed the American lead 
in mixed main batteries, the 8inch gun_s were deleted, and 
their speed was brought up to international standards.13 
At Santiago, the slow firing 13inch cannons of the Ind~_anas 
scored no hits, while the 8inch guns did hit, though with 
dismal marksmanship.14 With this demonstration, all 
nations took up dual and sometimes triple caliber main 
batteries.is The revival of the medium gun renewed the 
superposed controversy and even with several special boards 
the Navy could not reach a consensus.16 Therefore the 
Georgia/Connecticut class which made up most of the 
remaining American predreadnoughts were half built with 
superposed turrets and half without, a compromise both 
factions knew to be absurd. 
The Navy was similarly indecisive about the utility of 
underwater torpedo tubes on its capital ships, but the 
superposition controversy did the greatest damage in 
undermining Congressional confidence in the technical 
competency of the Navy. 1 7 This irritation 1.-Jas j us ti f ied 
because these debates could lead to adding two years to the 
construction of warships that at best ran a year behind 
Europeans because of American inexperience and developing 
infrastructure.1a This led to a steady escalation of 
Congressional involvement in Hhat should have been purely 
military decisions. 
The United States Congress had no inclination to 
surrender its line-by-line control of annual naval appro-
priations. The other naval powers soon found that long-
range planning improved efficiency. The Royal Navy had to 
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have Parliamentary approval of its annual budgets, but 
there was little interference on how the Admiralty could 
spend its appropriations, and it had a line of credit.19 
Ship construction and Navy yards provided one of the best 
sources of pork-barrel projects, and this had been the 
source of considerable corruption after the Civil War. The 
delegates of the Eastern seaboard continued to look after 
the interests of their constituents, but on the whole the 
Naval Affairs Committees had genuine patriotic motives. 
Congress forced several wise decisions upon the Navy. The 
overriding problems were the involvement of naval policy 
with transitory political issues, the cozy relations of the 
Bureaus with powerful Congressmen, and the lack of a shared 
vision between American naval leadership in the Navy and in 
Congress.20 
This lack of compatibility was apparent in the early 
1890s, when Congress only authorized one more battleship, 
the Iowa, and no armored cruisers until the onset of 
serious tensions with Spain in 1894. Instead, Congress 
authorized protected cruisers, torpedo boats, and subsid-
ized merchantmen for possible use as auxiliaries.21 The 
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cruisers proved particulary useful in the Spanish-American 
War, for scouting in the Caribbean and in the line of 
battle in the Pacific. After the war, Congress would force 
submarine construction upon the Navy though the first truly 
effective submarines of the Holland type r...iere an American 
invention.22 
Congress began to restore the coastal fortifications 
of the nation in the 1890s. The Report of the Endicott 
Board in 1891 called for a massive renovation and extension 
of the nation's once formidable passive defenses.23 The 
Navy had supported this project in the early 1880s, but the 
commitment to a battlefleet was thought to make such 
systems unnecessary, and it was a potent competitor for 
defense spending.24 Despite the Navy's derision, the older 
and less extensive works in the Dardenelles proved an 
insurmountable obstacle to the British and French Navies in 
L-Jorld War I. 
Congress had an established pattern of foisting the 
pet projects of pm~erful members upon the service; the 
Navy had the ram Katadhin to match the Congressional 
dynamite cruiser Vesuvius, though. Senator Eugene Hale of 
Maine ~-Jas the "Czar" of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee 
for most of this era and he fancied small battleships.25 
The charges that this was due to his concern for the Bath 
Iron ~larks seem to have been exaggerated, but Hale did 
force the ti·JO Idahos of about a third less displacement on 
the Navy.2c:. Instead of making the most of these ships, the 
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line insisted that the Idahos match the tactical capabil-
ities of the rest of the fleet; the closest the naval 
architects could come was a design that was capable of only 
seventeen instead of eighteen and a half knots.27 Once in 
service, the Admirals insisted that the Idahos keep up thus 
managing to keep them in port with chronically broken 
engines.2a 
The Navy had several internal problems that caused 
sufficient problems without these publicly aired quarrels. 
The mothballing of the Union fleet after the Civil War 
doubtless had saved a great deal of money for this prevent-
ed participation in the era of wild experimentation as 
naval architecture absorbed the inventions of the Indust-
rial Revolution. This also meant that when the New Navy 
was begun in 1883 the country had virtually no industrial 
capacity for the construction of modern warships. The 
United States chose to provide subsidies to private firms 
through guaranteed orders in order to modernize. This 
option was probably as good as any, but it led to extended 
disputes over the high prices charged to recover start up 
costs, especially in the price of armor. The inability of 
the nei.-1 arms manufacturers to live up to their promises 
caused many predictable delays though these were not 
comparatively severe.29 
The inexperience of American naval architects combined 
with the conflicting demands of the uncoordinated Bureaus 
i~as a rnore serious problem. The plans of the original 
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Maine and Texas were purchased abroad, and the first 
indigenous design, the Indianas had serious defects in 
their 13inch and 8inch turrets.30 Training was obtained by 
sending ensigns to naval architecture schools in Europe 
until 1901 when MIT imported the Norwegian George Hovgaard 
Cwho was noted for designing little coast defense ship).31 
Europeans tended to deride the American designers as 
"amateurs, .. and it wasn't until the Connecticut class that 
the Navy's warships were fully up to European stand-
ards . .32 
Despite their lack of professional respect the gravest 
errors of the Constructors of the Bureau of Construction 
and Repair were those common to the v.iarships of all the 
world's navies. Battleships of the predreadnought era were 
overloaded in the design phase and gained further weight 
during thei~ construction. This often put their most 
essential armor-,;,.the "belt" on the waterline--below i..iater 
negating its utility. The American naval architects at 
least were aware of the prob1em, but used an inelegant 
subterfuge of "normal•• or unloaded displacement and 
"full load." It was not reasonable to expect ship's 
captains to dump their coal before going into battle . .33 
The other universal defect was mounting secondary and 
sub-main battery guns in the hull where they were inoper-
able on all but the calmest days . .34 American designs had 
their own foibles, such as the prolonged retention of the 
rarn boH and the grossly undergunned "Big Ten" armored 
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cruisers, but these resulted primarily from the lack of 
any final authority on strategic and tactical require.rnents. 
The Naval War College undertook strategic planning 
from its birth in 1884, but George Dewey attacked Manila, 
instead of withdrawing to the West Coast almost by chance. 
Secretary of the Navy John D. Long established the Strategy 
Board to control naval operations during the Spanish-Amer-
ican war but this was disbanded afterwards.35 Through 
Secretary of the Navy's General Order ~ 524, Roosevelt 
established the General Board in· 1900 to function as a de 
facto general staff with responsibility for strategic 
planning and the determination of tactical requirements for 
future construction.36 The General Board lacked statutory 
authority and the Bureau of Construction and Repair 
established the Board on Construction as a rival influence 
on the design process.37 
The struggle over the establis.h.rnent of a professional 
central authority for the Navy became the single most 
deleterious friction for American Seapower in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. Luce• s one-time ••I nsurg-
ents .. had now become the naval establishment, and a new 
generation of "Young Turks" emerged to challenge their 
authority. The conflict would not become public until 
·1907, but the lines were drawn by ·1903.aa Admiral DeHey, 
who commanded the General Board, was inclined towards 
conciliation so the only immediate disharmony was the 
presentation of separate recommendations for ne'°~ construct-
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ion from the General Board, and the Board on Construction 
to the Congress, along with a third compromise suggestion 
from the Secretary of the Navy . .99 Not surprisingly, 
Congress usually chose to take its own counsel on appropri-
ations for new construction.40 
For thatime_being the partisans of the General Board 
were content with guerrilla warfare. The issue was 
gunnery, or rather, the failure of the Navy to do anything 
to improve its dismal shooting in the Spanish-American 
War. The basic problem was the lack of any means to use 
the heavy cannons with acceptable accuracy at even a 
fraction of the range of which they were capable. When 
Mahan had proposed his theory, it had been assumed that 
naval tactics would duplicate the point-blank melees at the 
Battles of Lissa and Mobile Bay. The war had strongly 
suggested that longer ranges were preferable. The future 
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske had suggested techniques for 
radical improvement even before the war, but was content to 
work slowly within the system.41 When future Admiral 
William S. Sims stumbled upon a method of improving the 
accuracy of the secondary battery he was not so patient. 
Sims had already demonstrated his capacity for 
muckraking with a scathing and unsolicited critique of the 
design of the Kearsarge and Kentucky. When his report on 
continuous-aim firing died in channels, he risked his 
career by writing directly to President Roosevelt. This 
audacity impressed Roosevelt as well as the soundness of 
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Sims' recommendations. This led to Sims appointment as the 
Director of Target Practice, where he could implement his 
policy. More importantly he gained the President's ear and 
confidence, later becoming Roosevelt's first Naval Aide. 
This gave Sims as the leader of the Young Turks his own 
power base from which to wage the fight for organizational 
reform. He had also discovered the most vulnerable aspect 
of the Bureau syste.rn--warship design--and he intended to 
use it.42 
On a more subtle level, the comprehensive nature of 
Mahan's Theory of Seapower led to a growing isolation of 
the Navy's leaders from the nation's other foreign policy 
apparatus. Mahan made it clear that the overriding naval 
mission was fighting other navies and that the increased 
pace of modern warfare required that the Navy be instantly 
ready to fulfill this function. The most important 
operational implication was· that the battlefleet had to be 
unified or concentrated at all times.4.3 Aside from being 
based on the a-historical premise that wars arise randomly 
and without forbodings, the principle of concentration was 
opposed to the traditional dispersal of naval elements, 
which the State Department had come to rely on as a 
major tool of foreign policy.44 
The Spanish-American War saw the first gathering of 
virtually all of the United States' capital ships in one 
battlefleet, includ~ng the Oregon that was needed badly in 
the Pacific.45 After the war, the battleships were 
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dispersed back to their regular stations. The General 
Board finally restored concentration after the Caribbean 
exercises in 1902 that coincided with the Venezuelan Crisis 
with Germany.46 The State Departrnent objected to this rnove 
but the main opposition had come from senior officers for 
whom command of a station was the fulfillment of their 
careers.47 . The concentration of the battlefleet in 
the Chesapeake in the summer and the Caribbean in the 
winter hampered the responsiveness of American diplomacy to 
events in the rest of the world. Squadrons would be 
dispatched and ·have an impact during the Perdicaris affair 
and the First Moroccan Crisis, but, overall, the navy's 
capabilities retracted significantly despite the major 
increase in responsibilities that came with the acquisition 
of the Spanish Empire.48 The armored cruisers becrune the 
workhorses of American foreign policy which effectively 
restricted gunboat diplomacy to underdeveloped countries. 
The economic determinants of war in Mahanian theory 
further increased the intellectual isolation of the Navy. 
In the predreadnought era, the Navy percieved Germany, the 
other rapidly rising naval and power, as the United States 
next foe.4<;t The United States and Germany each would need 
more bases and colonies to sustain their growth and there 
were not enough opportunities left for them both. The 
aggressive behavior of the German squadron in the Philip-
pines during the Spanish-American War may also have been a 
factor in this thinking. Admiral De1.-Jey and the German 
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commander had almost come to blows, that is fisticuffs. 
Dewey commanded the General Board and most of its members 
had been junior officers in the Asiatic Squadron.so 
Similarly, the promise of British support at Manila had 
greatly encouraged the Anglophilia of the United States 
Navy.s1 It was only after the Dreadnought that the Navy 
-"- - ··--
realized that its program was an implicit attempt to wrest 
hegemony from England, for the time being the Navy simply 
ignored the potentially deadly consequences of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. 
After the clash with Germany over the proper means of 
collecting the Venezuelan debt, Roosevelt was able to 
persuade Congress to continue the rapid buildup of the 
fleet. This policy was extremely effective in deterring 
German ambitions in the New World, and after 1904 the 
Kaiser had to "sedululously cultivate" American goodwill.52 
The Navy did not seem to understand this continuation of 
policy by other means. American officers were worked up 
into a bellicose frenzy when all that was immediately 
at stake was a Naval Appropriations Bill.53 The Navy did 
learn that the blandishment of foreign threats was a very 
effective method for extracting funds from Congress, though 
this tended to alienate the Democratic minority.s4 
The size and rapidity of the post-Maine buildup of the 
American battlefleet left an unpleasant legacy for the 
Dreadnought Navy, a serious manpower shortage. Capital 
ships require large crews whose salaries made up a major 
portion of their astronomical maintenance costs. The Navy 
i·Jas moving to el irninate the large number of al lens in its 
nineteenth century crews, but it could not afford competi-
tive pay by American standards, nor was it inclined to use 
conscripts as did Imperial Germany. ss Thus i·Jhen this new 
construction began to join the fleet in the midst of the 
Dreadnought Revolution, the Navy would have to increase 
significantly its manpower or cut back on further con-
struction as Congress was not a cornucopia. 
Despite the very serious institutional problems noted 
above, the United States transition to being a great naval 
power was an overall success. The United States had 
progressed to the rank of a great naval power from a 
position of neglible strength in a remarkably short period 
of time. These flaws had proven to be tolerable and might 
have continued to be so, but the Navy had not yet estab-
1 ished the now traditional f asc inaticm of the Arner lean 
military services with technology. This failing will be 
dealt with in more depth in the following chapter. 
Therefore the Navy•s unwillingness or inability to alter 
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its strategic approach in a new era of naval warfare became 
the greatest cause of the quiet debacle that would follow. 
This institutional rigidity did not diverge from the 
pattern that the New Navy had established in a time when 
there was less at stake. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE 
DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION 
The United States' adoption of a capital ship strategy 
had provided victory in the Spanish-American ~\far and 
diplomatic success in the Venezuelan Crisis, but the Navy's 
adaptation to its new role also would set the foundation 
for the future failure of the policy. Under the building 
programs for these events, the Navy was moving rapidly 
towards second place in the world rankings, implementing 
the goals of the Tracy Policy Board faster than could have 
been hoped. American naval architecture was gaining 
respect, if little praise, for the new Connecticut class 
battleships were up to international standards. The United 
States had developed the industrial capacity to maintain a 
modern navy, and public opinion was generally favorable. 
However, the bureaucratic and political entanglements that 
had led to the demise of the Old Navy had not bE,en exorcis-
ed. The Navy, despite its parvenu international status, 
had not yet developed the characteristic American military 
fondness for technology. Its inability to respond adequat-
ely to technological innovation) particularly in the torm 
ot the Lireadnought Revolution, was the primary determinant 
of the United States' Navy's ineffectualness during the 
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critical second decade of the twentieth century, the decade 
of the First World War. 
Under the building programs of 11cKinley and Roosevelt, 
the United States Navy was seizing a window of opportunity 
for the establishment of first rank maritime power. By 
·1904 both England and Germany had determined that they must 
cultivate American goodwill as they could not meet the 
American challenge in the New World while maintaining their 
positions in the old.1 This was precisely the strategic 
opportunity that Admiral Tirpitz had sought to exploit in 
his original Mahanian plans for the High Seas Fleet. 
Admiral Jackie Fisher would obviate this threat with his 
decision to ignore the American and/or Japanese threats 
and concentrate the Royal Navy in the North Sea.2 The 
United States had been building a genuine battlefleet, and 
had the opportunity to continue to do in March 1904 when 
Secretary of the Navy Morton proposed the construction of a 
super-armored cruiser and two battleships at a time r.--Jhen 
American theoretical development of the allbig-gun concept 
was as advanced as anywhere in the world.3 This oppor-
tunity to seize the technological initiative slipped away, 
and while American Dreadnoughts would be the result of .an 
independent initiative, the effort to establish a battle~ 
fleet was wrecked on economic and technological rocks. 
At the turn of the century, naval tactical require-
ments were evolving in directions that were not fulfilled 
by existing capital ships. After an era of wild experi-
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mentation, international naval architects in the 1890s 
reached a consensus, a standard battleship. These ships 
had main batteries of four heavy guns, an intermediate 
battery of twelve to thirty medium guns (often of two 
calibers>, and a variety of light guns for defense against 
torpedo boats. They displaced around twelve thousand tons 
~-1i th speeds of eighteen knots and a ram for close cornbat. 
Several developments were making it both desirable and 
feasible to fight at long range rather than to engage in 
melee. The range and efficiency of torpedoes was increas-
ing, and the new "smokeless" powder made carefully directed 
gunfire possible. Naval inventors, most notably Percy 
Scott and Bradley A. Fiske, were developing techniques and 
devices to make accuracy at long-range attainable. The 
Battles of Manila Bay and Santiago had demonstrated that 
being able to strike the foe at all at a range where his 
fire was completely ineffective, made for total and 
inexpensive victories. 
By 1900, many naval designers realized that a possible 
answer to the demands of long-range engagement lay in 
vessels with a large number· of heavy guns, an all-big-gun 
battleship.4 At the schools of naval architecture in 
Europe, the all-big-gun solution was a general topic of 
conversation. 0 Senior British officers were also discuss-
ing the concept and may have been doing so for three y~ars 
already.6 There were several rationales behind the 
all-big-gun battleship that were not entirely congruent. 
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These theories, which can be grouped for convenience in 
three schools-- .. Speed, •• .. Shell-Weight, .. and "Splash"-- all 
made contributions to the ultimate development of the 
dreadnoughts. Only one, though, irrefutably required 
the introduction of the huge and dauntingly expensive new 
dreadnought type. The Dreadnought Revolution was just 
that, not simply a step in a general trend towards larger 
battleships.7 
The most famous of the fathers of the dreadnought, 
John A. Fisher and Vittorio Cuniberti, were the leaders of 
the "Speed" school. They maintained that speed was the 
preeminent tactical quality of a warship, so that the new 
style of capital ship should be very fast. With this 
speed, Fisher and Cuniberti believed that the ship could 
choose its conditions of battle with impunity and, thus, 
should mount a large number of the heaviest cannons in 
order to deliver quick and mortal blows. They realized 
that disproportional increases in size were required to 
increase speed. This could be partially resolved by 
reducing armor, as their ship would not have to engage in 
sustained gun duels. Their views were quite debatable, but 
their prestige and proselytizing were most responsible for 
the creation of the Dreadnought.a 
The "Shell-Weight" school was most concerned with the 
superior firepower of larger guns; the weight and dest-
ructive power of a shell increases as the cube of its 
diameter. W i 11 iam S. Sims and Homer C. Poundstone i-Jere 
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best representative of this position, 
defined than the others. They realized that the capital 
ship of the future would be very large and would mount a 
uniform main battery, but they were willing to accept a 
gradual development towards this goal. The first, most 
critical step would be a larger ship with conventional 
ordnance, the deletion of the medium battery, and then a 
single caliber main battery, a true dreadnought. Sims and 
Poundstone were aware of the other schools and upheld these 
theories, but they took a realistic, if conservative, view 
of what was politically and financially possible.9 
William L. Rogers and Bradley A. Fiske r:·epresented the 
"Splash" school in the United States whose primary concern 
was with accuracy. Effective gunnery at long-range 
required some method to correct fire onto the target. 
Beyond five thousand yards only the splash of a miss could 
be observed, and it was impossible to distinguish between 
those created by 8-inch and 12-inch shells. Guns of 
differing caliber have very different ballistic charac-
teristics that required distinct fire-control information. 
Therefore, accurate gunfire demanded a uniform battery, and 
the more heavy guns the better. ·1 o The "Splash" method 
offered irresistible tactical advantages to the developer 
despite the increased costs of the larger ships that 
would be necessary. Combined with the rapid development. of 
range-finders and central fire-control systems, there Has :'I 
true technological revolution in gunnery. After the con-
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struction of the preadnought, the new type was subject to 
severe criticism that included rational objections to 
"Speed'' and ''Shel 1-t-Jeight." The logic of the "Splash" 
school was far more difficult to deny. 
No less a figure than Alfred Thayer Mahan, then at the 
height of his fame, led the opposition to the all-big-gun 
ship. He rejected the speed argument because it depended 
entirely upon the condition of the vessel and was the least 
reliable attribute of a warship. He believed that the 
Q'uick-Firing guns of the medium battery would del lver an 
overwhelming volume of shells that could do fatal cumulat-
ive damage to the unarmored portions of a foe. Mahan also 
. 
doubted the effectiveness of long-range gunnery, and felt 
that it was somewhat unmanly. His main objection was 
against the increased costs. This would distribute a 
nation's defenses in too few hulls, and would disrupt the 
informal arms limitation of the conventional battleship.11 
The Prophet was correct, but for the wrong reasons. 
Despite his prestige, the American advocates of the new 
battleship would have more trouble with bureaucratic 
obstruction than with theoretical argurnents. 
Sims and his "Insurgents" had chosen the realm of 
warship design as the battlefield in the struggle for 
organizational reform in the Navy. They wished to surmount 
the seven Bureaus of the Navy, which were virtually inde-
pendent fiefs, with a proper Prussian-style General Staff. 
The Bureau system had caused serious problems in the design 
process of American warships because of its overlapping 
spheres of responsibility. The chief faults were the lack 
of overall accountability for the success or failure, and a 
very muddled conflict-resolution process. The Board on 
Construction and the General Board had conflicting mandates 
to determine the desired qualities of new construction.12 
Although the Bureau of Construction and Repair (BuCon) had 
general oversight over ships' plans, propulsion and 
armament were handled by separate Bureaus. When dissention 
arose over a proposed design (which was very frequent> the 
Secretary of the Navy would convene a special board to 
render judgement. The officers of the line had very little 
input in the evolution of a design, though they usually 
held th~ majority on these special boards.1a The "Insur-
gents" were not interested, however, in just a reforJT1 of 
the design process, but in a complete overhaul of the Navy. 
The first documented stirrings of the dreadnought 
concept in the United States came in ·1901, wit.h strong 
suggestions of a British influence. In March Sims was in 
Hong Kong while en route to assignment, and there rnet Percy 
Scott, the Royal Navy's gunnery expert. In one of the most 
underrated intelligence coups in American history, Scott 
proceeded to divulge all of his latest theories and 
developments. Sims learned of the "Splash" roethod of 
long-range gunnery, though Scott's concept of "Continuous 
Aim'' for improving intermediate fire excited him more. 
Upon reaching the nearly derelict r1on.Q.~..L§!.Y.., Sims fell in 
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with Homer C. Poundstone, and both began working diligently 
on new battleship designs. Poundstone devised three 
schemes-- a modest improvement dubbed the ••Feasible," a 
semi-dreadnought called the .. Probable," and a true all-
big-gun design, the ''Possible." Poundstone had received 
training as a naval architect at Annapolis and at the 
European schools,- but these circumstances suggested that 
the primary inspiration for the "Possible" had come frorn 
Scott. It has been reported that Sims referred to the 
"Possible" as the ••skeerd 0 •Nothin," .. an obvious American-
ization of Dreadnought ... 14 
The following year saw the first professional writing 
on the subject, and the first officially generated sketch 
designs. In May and June, Cuniberti published articles in 
Marine Rundschau, although these reached a limited aud-
ience.15 However, in Ma~ch, Matt H. Signor suggested a 
mixed all-big-gun battleship in an article in the seJT1i-of-
ficial Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute. 
Philip R. Alger replied in the June issue, proposing a ship 
with eight 12-inch guns.16 BuCon was then studying designs 
for the troublesorne srna;Ll battles.hips of the Ic!?ho_ class. 
One of the al tern a ti ve schernes mounted tt-iel ve ·1 0- inch guns, 
which was indisputably an independently derived all-big-gun 
battleship.17 Naval authorities soon rejected the 10-inch 
gun as too small for the main battery, and later difficul-
ties in designing the Michigans suggested that this plan 
could not have been realized.18 Although the Navy•s 
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designers were scorned as amateurs in Europe, they had been 
the first to begin development of t~e most important 
development in capital ships until the airc~aft carrier. 
Unfortunately, the special board for the Idahos rejected 
this proposal, which BuCon would interpret as a repudiation 
of the all-big-gun approach.19 
In 1903, Cuniberti and Poundstone published major 
articles and the General Board took official notice of the 
new theories. "An Ideal Battleship for the British Navy" 
was the single most important step in the origin of the 
dreadnoughts. Cuniberti's piece through its publication in 
Jane's Fighting Ships legitimized the concept in the eyes 
of the general naval community. The article was a pure 
example of the"Speed'' school, and the vessel he proposed 
was beyond the attainment of existing technology.20 
Poundstone's two articles in Proceedings mostly argued for 
the "Feasible" and the "Probable." The General Board 
instructed the Naval War College to test the concept in its 
Sumrner WargaITies, but did not mention their interest in the 
unofficial 1903 program.21 
The outcome of these simulated battles greatly favored 
the new type, which stimulated the General Board to 
cautious action.22 In October, it requested that BuCon 
develop plans for a ship with ''twelve heavy turret guns, 
none which shall be less than 10 inches and at least four 
of 1.-<hich shall be 12 inche.s ... 23 Willi=-rn Rogers, who had 
directed the games, objected to the Board's proposal of a 
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mixed main battery in his official report. In thi:s; 
memorandum Rodgers argued for the superior gunnery offered 
by a uniform batt.ery.24 Despite repeated prodding, BuCon 
would not begin development of this proposal for eleven 
months, in part because of a shortage of personne1.2s 
The advocates of the all-big-gun battleship did not 
wait while the Russo-Japanese War provided the first real 
test of the modern fleets of major powers. .Japan ordered 
the battleships Aki and Satsuma in late ·190"~. These sh i p~3 
were originally designed with ten 12-inch guns, six to be 
mounted in single wing turrets. These sem i-dreadno11gh t,::; 
i-.iould not be completed until ·1910, with an armament of four 
It was not clear if the 12-inch and twelve 10-inch guns. 
original design was workable.26 The Japanese designers 
seer11ed to h.=ive been in accordance Hi th tJir,;3 ,.Shell-Vieight-" 
school as their later Kav-iachi class, although generally 
counted as dreadnoughts, mounted 12-inch guns of both 45 
and 50 caliber i·,hich negated the "Splash" rationale for 
the Dreadnought Revolution. 
BuCon's procrastination did not deter the advocates of 
the ne~ type in the United States. Poundstone begc:rn 
c ire u 1 a ting "detailed plans" of the "Poss ib 1 e" in .June 
1904.27 Sims was serving as Theodore Roosevelt's naval 
aide, and engaged the Comrriander-in-Chief's forrnidable, if 
transitory attention to the battleship question. Roos12vel t 
found the triple battery of the latest American predread-
n o u g h t s p e c u 1 i a r , an d i.;i r o t e t. h at i t " ;3 e em s t. o m e t. h .:. t. \:. he 
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armament should be composed of 12" or ·1 'I" guns and a 
secondary battery of 3" guns."28 In October, he instructed 
BuCon to consider building the newly authorized New Hamp-
shire as an all-big-gun battleship.29 The Bureau quickly 
responded that "nothing has transpired during the past year 
to justify extensive changes in the main battery of vessels 
building or recently designed" and that the Conn_<;:_ct icg___~ 
class were "as powerful as anything built or building in 
Europe."30 BuCon also produced supporting memos from t.he 
Bureau of Navigation and the recently retired Chief Con-
structor of the Royal Navy.31 As the President took no 
further action at that time, this barrage apparently was 
enough to satisfy him. 
The Royal Navy had not viewed the previous year as so 
uneventful. The naval battle of Port Arthur had seen 
effective gunfir~ at twelve thousand yards, and Fisher had 
at.tained coJ111T1and of the fleets. He began serious work on 
the Dreadnought in the spring of 1904.32 The Royal Navy 
made an explicit commit.rnent to the all-big-gun ship in 
October, and Fisher summoned a committee, packed ~·iith his 
supporters, which began meeting in January 1905. Their 
report. was completed on February 2·1 , the final design 1.-Jas 
completed in March, and the Dreadnought was laid down on 
ltctober 2. Fi sher had begun to assemble ma t.erials in 
,January. By such means, the Dreadnought_ was completed 
before the end of 1906 in record time.33 
On March 3, 1905, The Congress of the United States 
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authorized the construction of two battleships of the 
f'lichigan class. The authorization was for ships of the 
same cost and displacement as their predecessors, which 
would not indicate the intention of building anything 
radical.34 The Congressional debate over funding these 
vessels was devoid.of any reference to the all-biggun 
concept.35 Congress stipulated that no money was to be 
appropriated until the Secretary of the Navy had approved 
final blueprints.36 This was apparently decided in 
co111111itt.ee to express irritation with the prolonged squabb-
ling over the designs of the Connecticpts and the J.9_.=ih<]"s. 
The Annual Report of the Navy Department did not mention 
what limited developments had already been made.37 
In September ·1904, BuCon had at last begun its study 
of the all-big-gun theory, which would produce unantici-
pated dividends due to the problem of ~..iorking Hit.hin the 
Congressional size limit.3S In October, there was a 2ketch 
of an all ·12-inch gun ship utilizing wing turrets. 3·c;. 
Although American battleships typically mounted intermed-
iate guns in such turrets, the constructors found that 
heavier cannons would compromise structural integri l:y to :m 
unacceptable degree.40 The early months of !905 probably 
Vi ere spent trying to resolve this probler!l J.-.J i t.h 1 ighter 
10-inch guns, but without success.41 Radical steps were 
necessary, and Chief Constructcir Washington L. Capps 
decided to use superfiring turrets. Although it would not 
be known whether the raised turrets would prevent the lower 
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turrets from engaging targets fore and aft, Capps felt that 
broadside firepower JA1as the critical element. 42 The design 
process then proceeded rapidly: the finalized plans were 
submitted to the Navy in November, and approved on Decerriber 
I 
-15, 1905.43 
By this tiine the specifications of the Qreadnou.e:ht had 
reached the press and her revolutionary nature revealed; 
news that would paralyze the United States Navy. The Navy 
had not expected the Dreadnought to be anything unusual, 
there had been a major breakdown in information gather-
ing. 44 Since the War of 1812, the American naval tradition 
had called for individually superior warships. The 
Michigans were a far superior prototype of later develop-
ments, but they were gravely overmatched. The Di:_§§dpougl}_I;,__ 
by virtue of ti.-lo thousand tons greater displ.;icement and 
turbine engines, was significantly faster and carried more 
guns placed higher above the water. AdJTiiral Dewey and the 
General Board campaigned to have the Michigans re..:...;iuthor-
ized in order to equal the English monster.45 Mahan was 
aghast at the total elimination of the intermediate 
battery, and complained loudly and publicly. This pressure 
from both sides forced Roosevelt to suspend construction 
for a year while the matter was resolved.46 
Togo's annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet at 
Tsushima provided a clear test for the contending tactical 
theories. Mahan based his arguments around a faulty 
account of the battle which unde~estimated the Japanese 
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speed advantage and overestimated the effect of a "hail of 
fire" from the intermediate guns.47 Sims' reply based on 
correct information, dismasted Mahan in all eyes but his 
own.4B However, it should be noted that while the Ameri-
cans had to wait for press reports, the English had an 
observer with the Japanese fleet who quickly confirmed the 
decision of Fisher's committee to use the heaviest guns.~Is. 
The anti-Dreadnought forces did win the point that the 
3-inch anti-torpedo boat battery on the Michigans was 
inadequate, and then retreated to supporting small, 
all-big-gun battleships. 
In June 1906 Congress again turned to naval appro-
priations, now well aware of the Dreadnought. The Navy 
delivered a divided recommendation for the authorization of 
new battleships. The Secretary and the Board on Construct-
ion wanted three more Michigans, while the General Board 
insisted on two genuine dreadnoughts.so Each proposal cost 
about the same, so the basic issue was many "loH-tech"' 
ships or a few "high-tech" ships. In any event, Congress 
was not impressed at the Navy's indecision and authorized 
only one battleship. This ship was not restricted in size, 
but her design was to be determined by an open competition, 
with the winning plans to be funded only after Congress-
ional inspection and approval. 0 1 This verdict would be a 
crushing setback to the development of the American 
battlefleet, but it is hard to fault Congress given the 
impression given by the Navy that it didn't know what it 
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was doing. The design cornpeti tion would so delay the 
!_)elaware that she was cornpleted only a week before her 
sister, the North Dakota, authorized in 1907. Bu Con 
cornpleted the basic work on these plans in July, as well as 
those for the later Arkansas class.52 These designs had 
sorne flaws, but the ships were at least equal to their 
foreign contemporaries. The Bureau was capable of prodig-
ious effort and artful work when outsiders threatened its 
province. 
Four years later the South Carolina, t1icf!iga_1J.., D~L~­
ware, and North Dakota finally joined the Atlantic Fleet. 
This delay destroyed the opportunity of the United States 
to establish itself independently as a great naval power 
with global commitments. In 1908 Roosevelt attempted to 
re-establish the place of the United States in the Inter-
national Naval Race, an effort which was doomed to failure 
because of the highly inefficient fiscal management of the 
Navy.5.3 Problems in the design process and the two year 
lag in construction that these spawned were major but not 
the primary causes of the deficiencies of the Navy. The 
greatest failure was that of the leadership of the Navy 
that did not adapt to the changed strategic position of the 
United States. They had the perfect solution of Sea Power 
and saw no need to modify it. 
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AMERICAN CAPITAL SHIP STRATEGY AND 
DREADNOUGHT POLICY TO THE 
UNITED STATES' ENTRY IN 
THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
The completion of the predreadnoughts ordered during 
the Spanish-American War had carried the United States 
Navy past France to second place in the world rankings in 
roughly 1904; because of the delays in the completion of 
the first American dreadnoughts, Germany had passed the 
United States by 1911 .1 Such rankings were based only on 
the number of warships in the fleet, so this does not 
reflect the qualitative decline in the Navy's effective-
ness. Pressed by a wide array of strategic dilemmas, the 
Navy's leadership believed the only answers were contained 
in the Theory of Sea Power, and, in their interpretation, 
the Capital Ship Strategy solved all problems with more 
battleships. 
The Navy's decision to devote all its efforts to the 
preparedness of the battlefleet, especially to acquiring 
more dreadnoughts had a profound impact on all aspects of 
national strategy. Within the Navy, factionalism grew as 
Sims' Insurgents honestly sought improvement in the design 
process in order to get the Navy better battleships 
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and more scientific management of the battlefleet. The 
manpower crisis became more severe, and research and 
development of new technologies was impeded. More irnport-
antly, the Navy in general, and the General Board in 
particular, became progressively autonomous and isolated 
from domestic and international affairs. The Navy would 
keep to its own course which sometimes ran against the 
foreign policies of Taft and Wilson, although the converse 
was also and often true. After the return of the Great 
White Fleet, the Navy rapidly ceased to be an important 
factor in international diplomacy. Roosevelt's successors 
were, indeed, much less inclined to an active policy, but 
this did not relieve the Navy of its responsibilities to 
enhance and protect the national interest. 
As in perhaps all defense debates the crucial issue 
was funding. In t905, President Roosevelt had declared 
that he was "satisfied" with the development of the fleet, 
and that thereafter only one battleship annually would be 
necessary.2 He hastily recanted after hearing of HMS 
Dreadnought, but the Democrats had been given a very 
effective stick for opposing further naval expansion.3 In 
the election of ·1912 it became prudent for candidate 
Woodrow Wilson to favor the "traditional'' Roosevelt policy 
of "two battleships per year," and in ·1916 to become a 
full-blown navalist.4 Yet for the criti~al years of the 
Dreadnought Race, Congress would not appropriate enough 
money for the Navy to remain competitive; given the 
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higher American operating expenses it was questionable if 
this was a fiscally possible option.5 The General Board 
felt that its entire recommendation had to receive Con-
gressional approval every year, and essentially refused to 
compromise . .:. The failure to adopt naval strategy and 
policy to this vital consideration was a Navy decision, 
properly within its domain, neither the Congress nor the 
President realistically could be blamed for failing to give 
the Navy everything it wanted. 
The advent of the Dreadnought generated the first 
public debate and controversy over warship design in the 
United States. The South Carolinas could be argued to have 
proceeded the Dreadnought, and Scientific American could 
maintain that they were better ships ton-for-ton.7 How-
ever, the Dreadnought was a sharp challenge to the American 
tradition of individually superior naval vessels for the 
larger British ship was unquestionably better. The 
General Board campaigned actively, but futilely to have the 
South Carolinas re-authorized to match the Dreadnought.a 
This served only to heighten the debate over the Dread-
nought principle. BuCon, Senator Hale, and Mahan all 
favored smaller battleships, and the later was a name to 
conjure i.-~i th. As noted above, Sims won this argument, 
and Mahan eventuall:> came to advocate Dreadnoughts, but 
intra-service tensions were heightened.9 
The first major post-Dreadnought friction to develop 
within the Navy revealed the underlying struggle for 
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bureaucratic reform. Under Roosevelt the General Board and 
the Naval Aide system had been created, but only through 
Executive Fiat.10 As his second term waned Sims felt 
compelled to establish more formal and comprehensive 
reforms, and he had just completed a major contest on thf:3 
issue of design. Sims worked through the naval artist 
Henry Reuterdahl (probably with Roosevelt's knowledge) to 
publish a broad attack on the Bureau system in the muck-
racking McClure's Magazine. The article, "The Needs of Our 
Navy," focused on the confusion in the process of designing 
warships, on which even Mahan had commented.1-1 However, 
the bulk of the criticisms were directed at problems common 
to most of the world's battleships. BuCon with very strong 
support frOJTi Senator Eugene Hale was able to bury .the 
ensuing investigation in committee when the Insurgents 
proved to be better armed than expected.12 
Thwarted in this effort, the Insurgents took their 
last shot before Roosevelt retired. The -•real' American 
dreadnoughts of the North Dakota class, ~nd their near 
sisters the Floridas had certain flaws that the Insurgents 
publicized. Roosevelt had to surnmon a large special board 
to the Naval War College to settle the matter. This 
time, Sims and his cohorts had much less sound arguments 
and they were soundly defeated at the Newport Conference. 
Their underlying desire had been to try to introduce the 
use of 14-inch guns instead of the standard 12-inch rifle 
in order to reclaim the technological initiative for the 
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United States. Roosevelt himself rejected their position 
because it would entail further extensive delays before the 
battleships were completed.13 This followed a general 
change in naval policies internationally, to cor11plete 
warships as designed rather than accept the delays of 
modifying the vessels to the latest standards during 
construction.14 In this instance, it might have been a 
worthwhile step for the United States to have taken, but, 
given the long lag in American construction already 
experienced, Roosevelt's judgement cannot be condernned. 
Under the Taft administration the reformers were able 
to make srnall gains such as gaining the statutory author-
ization of the General Board, but the lingering controversy 
regained steam under Wilson.15 The Navy had little faith 
in the Democrat's sudden conversion to moderation in 
defense policy, and under Bradley Fiske's leadership was 
able to slip the creation of the Office of Chief of Naval 
Operations through Congress.16 The new Secretary of the 
Navy, the pacifist Josephus Daniels, responded by appoint-
ing a compliant non-entity to the post.17 Daniels was the 
first Secretary to master the Navy ~ince Gideon Welles, and 
though he was a very active advocate of the Navy in some 
areas, his relations with the admirals was generally 
hostile. Daniels was particularly concerned about the 
status of enlisted men in the fleet. He doubtless accom-
pl ished some good but his anti-VD rnoral i ty campaign was 
ridiculed and his dispatch of the battlefleet on a European 
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cruise because a sailor complained about his lack of sea 
time was ridiculous.1s 
Appropriations were a major factor in the Navy's 
li111i ted research and development effort, al though profess-
ional conservatism also played a role. American con-
structors came up with several notable advances, most 
notably the use of superfiring turrets to concentrate 
main-battery fire on the center-line, and the ''all-or-no-
thing" method of distributing armor only on the most vital 
sectionsof a battleship.19 However, the period was more 
accurately characterized by unfulfilled promises and the 
premature use of untested principles. American naval 
architects became more adept, and designed battleships to 
beat their i.l'fllT1ediate contemporaries, but this advantage was 
lost through the longer building time. It was not until 
-19-12, when the Oklahomas formed the mold for the semi-
standardized second generation of American dreadnoughts, 
that the Navy really gained parity with its contempor-
aries.20 
The American opportunity to launch the first all-big-
gun battleship has been noted, as well as Fiske's early 
work on fire control. The Navy was not particularly 
interested in aeroplane or submarine development either. 
Fiske had an early interest in the possibility of a torpedo 
carrying aeroplane, but after some failures in preliminary 
tests the project was discontinued.2 1 Great opportunities 
lay in the further development of the "Ironsides" project 
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for a battleship well protected against plunging fire (ie 
long-range steep trajectory shells), and torpedoes.22 As 
designers of all the Powers once had trouble overloaded the 
predreadnoughts, the tactical principles of long-range 
combat were not reflected in the arrangement of armor until 
after World War I.23 The "Ironsides" project was fruitful 
in its stepchild, the "al 1-or-nothing" armor scheine i.-.1hich 
ignored the hail of fire from the secondary battery that 
Mahan had once feared by leaving non-vital areas of the 
ship completely unprotected.24 
The Navy usually had to use front-line ships as test 
beds for new technologies. The Chester class light 
cruisers, the only light cruiser built by the United States 
from the Spanish-American War to World War I, tested 
reciprocating, Parson turbine, and Curtiss turbine power 
plants. All ended up in reserve which was no great loss, 
as they were only overgrown destroyers too srnal 1 to 
provide all weather scouting for the battlefleet.25 
The North Dakota also employed the unsuccessful Curtiss 
turbines which could not be kept in operating condition. 
The North Dakota was the only American dreadnought left in 
reserve, which was a significant loss to the Navy's combat 
strength.26 
An equally serious problem lay in the develop111ent of 
new cannons, which was one of the most intense areas of 
competition in the international dreadnought race. The 
Navy brought out a new model of 40-caliber 12-inch gun 
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to serve as the primary piece for the World War I era 
battlefleet. This cannon proved to be too weak in service 
and after several accidents they had to be removed and 
retro-fitted i-~ith an external reinforcement of wrapped 
wire. Even so, the cannon was not trusted, and the Navy 
directed that a reduced propellant charge be used, with a 
significant decrease in penetrating power.27 
The Navy's personnel policies tended to decrease the 
available strength of the fleet. Some, most notably Peter 
Karsten, and some democratic Congressmen of the time, 
charged that the entire push for the expansion of the Navy 
was based on its officer's quest for job opportunity and 
security.2a James Abrahamson noted that a continued 
"guerre de course" strategy would have provided more jobs, 
especially more command billets, through its hordes of 
torpedo craft.29 This debate seems to have been off 
course, for the Navy's manpower did grow steadily. The 
further increas~s needed to properly man the battlefleet 
were sacrificed, like the necessary destroyers and col-
liers, for more battleship construction.3o The number 
of seamen authorized for the Spanish-American was not 
adequate to man the new battleships Congres~ authorized 
during hostilities, much less those built during the 
Venezuelan Crisis to intimidate Germa.ny or the ne~'1 dr·ead-
noughts. The older battleships had to be laid up, and 
there was not enough manpower to maintain a nucleus crew 
sy:=.tem <;+03 of normal completement > to keep the vessels 
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readily deployable as Fisher had introdticed in England.31 
Fisher's option of discarding the oldest ships was also not 
exercised, rather all the American predreadnought battle-
ships were extensively modernized after the return of the 
Great White Fleet.32 The situation became almost absurd as 
when the officers of the Nebraska were left to raise their 
own crew, or when battleships were stripped of their crews 
to pull an armored cruiser out of reserve to react to some 
new diplomatic crisis.33 
The Navy's policy on the deployment of its ships 
further contributed to the unpreparedness of the fleet. 
The general view was that fewer ships with intensely 
drilled crews could overmatch conscripts or reservists. 
That view in itself was sound, but the intensive training 
of the battlefleet led to a more rapid depreciation of a 
comparatively limited number of assets. The Navy held 
Summer Exercises off Virginia, and Winter Exercise in the 
Caribbean, besides finding time for a major overseas 
deployment most years.34 Non11ally, these procedures meant 
an increase of time in the yards for refits and repairs, 
but, during prolonged deployments such as the i-Jorld Cruise 
or the Occupation of Vera Cruz, the American battlefleet 
rapidly began to notice its high mileage.35 The intensive 
gunnery drill which Sims introduced also wore out the 
short-lived main battery guns so quickly that at one point 
the Navy had to consider the abolition of target practice 
altogether.36 
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The deficiencies in technology and operations were 
severe, but the gravest problems lay in the Navy•s strateg-
ic functions. Because of the vagaries of American politi-
cal leadership, the General Board was essentially the only 
naval policy and/or strategy making apparatus, and the 
Board itself recognized that the unofficial 1903 Program 
was no more than a sketch.37 The Board was aware of the 
inbalance of the fleet, but because of its particularly 
strong attachment to the Capital Ship strategy it acqui-
esced in the maintenance of the battlefleet at all costs. 
This accorded with the Mahanian view of the mission of the 
Navy and the nature of the strategic threats against the 
United States. 
In the General Board's assesroent, the Navy had to 
enforce the Monroe Doctrin€, including the Roosevelt 
Corollary, and defend the Panama Canal which attracted 
trade and thus unwelcome attention to the Americas. 38 t,lhen 
Japan began to be seen as a threat, Asiatic Exclusion was 
added as a naval mission.39 War would be caused only by 
economic competition, so such rising pm-lers as Japan and 
Germany, were the only threats. As the economic nature of 
war rnade coalition warfare illogical, Germany would come 
alone across the Atlantic to fight us, or the Navy would 
cross the Pacific to fight Japan. The battlef leet had to 
be kept in the Caribbean to match the more powerful German 
menace, especially until the completion of the Canal.40 
The Board's strategic vision formed the basis of the 
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later Two-Ocean Navy, and the current 600 Ship 'all ocean 
Navy, ' but it did 1 i ttle to enhance the conternporary 
strategic interests of the United States. Passively 
waiting for a foe to come to the Caribbean abandoned any 
leverage in European affairs, and left the Pacific tempt-
ingly unguarded.41 The only answer seemed to lay in 
deploying battlefleets to both theatres, which would 
require more than forty-eight battleships, enough to annoy 
Great Britain. This logic drove the steadily escalating 
ambitions of the Navy from a fleet "second to one", to 
"second to none," to outright maritime supremacy, to a 
virtual "two power standard" in the decade froJTi 191 0 to 
1920.42 These rising ambitions have been fulfilled and may 
have provided a useful stimulant, but they accomplished 
little at the time. 
The faults in strategic orientation could have been 
redeemed in part with operational elan but this was 
lacking until after 1913. Since 1902 most of the Navy's 
war planning efforts had gone into War Plan Black against 
Germany.43 Black presumed that the German Fleet would 
seek a base near Puerto Rico, and sought to meet the foe 
in decisive battle before the High Seas Fleet arrived in 
the Caribbean. This neatly anticipated the German st.rat-
egy, Operational Plan I I I, ~-,ihich the German General Staff 
worked out after the Venezuelan Crisis. The hypothetical 
implementation of both plans probably would have resulted 
in overwhelming American victory as the Germans counted on 
73 
surprise and initiative which they clearly would have 
lacked.44 However, the Germans shelved their plan as a 
fantasy for the indefinite future in 1906, while the Navy 
was still working on Black ten years later.45 Wilson 
banned further development of plans against Germany in 
·19·14, but when this prohibition was removed in ·1917 the 
Navy focused its efforts for several months on a scheme for 
an independent American amphibious descent on Holland.46 
The War Plan for Japan, code-named Orange, was in 
contrast admirably pragmatic. Orange called for the 
withdrawal of any Pacific forces to the west coast to be 
joined by the Atlantic Fleet for a slow march back across 
the Pacific.47 This anticipated the actual course of 
World War II quite accurately. The Navy's plans for the 
Pacific showed an element of detachment, though. The Army 
wished to defend the Philippines, but the Navy would only 
agree if a great fortress was established. This idea 
foundered over disagreement over whether Manila or Subic 
Bay should be the site.48 Both services seemed to ignore 
the recent fate of Port Arthur. During the second round 
of the San Francisco School Crisis with Japan in 1913, the 
Navy decided that war was immanent and began implementing 
Orange without political authorization. This contributed 
as much to Wilson's prohibition of continued planning as 
his desire to maintain non-bellicose appearances during 
World t.Jar I. 49 
The Navy's war plans did not extend much beyond 
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Orange and Black, and were operationally limited in all 
cases. When Fiske arrived at the Naval War College, he 
was shocked to discover that the main plans were merely 
sketches and outlines.50 The only contingency for war with 
England, War Plan Red, was an outline by Mahan from the 
1890s that called for a kamikaze attack on Halifax as the 
United States' only chance.51 Great Britain meanwhile had 
determined that with a lot of luck, Canada might be 
defended successfully.52 The only plan actually used was 
Green, against Mexico, drawn up for Wilson in 1913 and 
partially enacted the following year.53 
In this Neptunian atmosphere, the Navy grei<1 increas-
ingly distant from the Executive Branch in the. implement.at.-
ion of foreign policy and national strategy. The last and 
greatest glory had come with the World Cruise of the Great 
White Fleet. The Navy viewed this expedition as a general-
ly successful test of the feasibility of Orange, great 
publicity, and a diplomatic coup through deterring Japanese 
ambitions.54 Perhaps so, but it was also a great temptat-
ion for the Imperial Japanese Navy to repeat Tsushima 
against an unsupported force of capital ships far from a 
safe base. In any case, the Navy gained a fancy for long 
deployments which ceased to have any positive diplomatic 
value under Taft and Wilson. 
What little foreign policy Taft pursued was aimed at 
the Open Door in China, and profits and jobs through 
overseas sales of naval technology. His greatest success 
75 
was the sale of two dreadnoughts to Argentina, though at 
the price of free access to the Navy's latest technological 
developments.55 Later in 1914, the Argentines would offer 
these ships back to the United States at bargain prices, 
but the Navy was not interested, preferring newly designed 
ships for its money, despite the storm about to break in 
Europe.56 The expansion of American interests in China 
required the cultivation of Germany in order to balance 
Japan and England.57 Unfortunately the Navy chose to snub 
the Kaiser on its first European cruise and, on the next, 
Sims promised England America's undying support; this 
tended to undermine diplomatic efforts.!58 Under Wilson, 
the battlefleet made only the one previously mentioned and 
pointless cruise before being sent to Vera Cruz to rust at 
anchor. 
The Navy imagined and acted as though it was an equal 
competitor in the Anglo-German Dreadnought Race, but. the 
last opportunity to continue the post-Spanish-American \"Tar 
advances of the Capital Ship Strategy had been lost in 
1908.59 Although Roosevelt kept a safe distance from the 
Insurgent's progressive reforms, he made his own last 
effort for the fleet he had done so much to create. 
Roosevelt actively carnpaigned for the authorization of four 
dreadnoughts for 1909, the pace required to keep up with 
England and Germany, and for a Navy Personnel Bill to 
alleviate the now chronic manpower shortfall.60 Congress 
would not-be swayed, and authorized only two of the four 
76 
battleships. 
A clearer political message could not have been sent, 
but the Navy determined to reef its sails and ride out the 
storm because the Capital Ship Strategy was the only 
proper course. This patience was rewarded because the 
European strategists had not discovered Napoleon's formula 
for quick and profitable victories, and because Wilson 
acted to reap as many benefits as possible for the United 
States. These were not contingencies upon which to rely. 
In the spring of 1917, the resumption of unrestricted 
submarine warfare was based, in part, on the German 
government's determination that United States Navy posed no 
immediate threat and that it would take too long to 
mobilize America's other resources. 
this gamble was largely successful. 
The first part of 
Sims' insistence, as 
the American liaison to the Royal Navy, on the Allied 
adoption of the convoy system probably was more critical to 
the defeat of the U-Boat crisis than the three sco~e 
destroyers he slowly extracted from the Navy's battle-
fleet. 0 1 The Royal Navy had contained the German battle-
fleet, obviating the need for the Navy to perform its 
primary Mahanian function, and Woodrow Wilson had banned 
war planning in 1914, so no alternate role had been found. 
Despite the significant nature of these defenses of the 
Navy's lack of impact, the real flaw lay in the Navy's 
ideology and the structure of the fleet built to conform 
with this faith in Sea Power. 
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The Navy had not wavered until almost the end. The 
1916 Program, and War Emergency Program offered the Navy 
whatever it wanted, and it wanted more dreadnoughts 
despite the existing imbalance of the fleet and the 
perilous position of the Allies. Only reluctantly would 
the Navy agree to suspend work on the new battleships in 
order to speed the construction of four hundred dest-
royers .62 As it developed these battleships would not be 
built at all, for after the war, England could no longer 
aspire to keep up having won a pyrrhic victory. The 
American predreadnoughts were discarded in arms tests, and 
the early dreadnoughts were scrapped to meet treaty 
limitations. In this, the fruits of Mahan"s and Roose-
velt's labors probably proved more useful to the nation 
than they had in active service. 
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A survey of the standard diplomatic histories on the 
origins of the First World War finds very few references to 
American diplomacy. For European Powers, the United States 
was a very minor consideration, until after the Race to 
the Sea and the ensuing Shell Shortage of 1915. The vital 
interests of the United States had been involved in the 
unravelling of the European Balance of Power. A clear 
victory by either alliance likely would have been followed 
by a renewed interest in the Western Hemisphere. f .. lahan 's 
fears of increasing European involvement in the Americas 
had been well founded at the turn of the century. The Navy 
was not, and should not have been, in control of American 
foreign policy, but should have been at least seeking 
strategic solutions for this obvious and dangerous contin-
gency. 
As has been seen, the United States Navy's military 
effectiveness and ability to project its power drastically 
dee 1 ined from ·1908 to ·19·17, during the peak of the inter-
national Dreadnought race. This decline cannot be attrib-
uted to a lack of funding, a lack of technological infra-
structure or inventiveness, or to the Navy's misapprehen-
sion of its role in a democratic society. The implements 
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for a successful maritime strategy were in place, and a 
lack of political leadership did not account completely for 
their misuse. The problem was the Navy's singleroinded 
devotion to Mahan's Theory of Sea Power in its simplest 
form, the Capital Ship Strategy. 
Mahan, the ideologue for the growth of the fleet, was 
a sincere Christian who could not countenance aggression, 
except in the context of taking up the "white man's 
burden." For him, the battlefleet's essential function 
was changed from fighting wars to preventing them. The 
adoption of a strategy of deterrence called for subtle 
leadership to react to an unstable external environment and 
to maintain a credible threat. Roosevelt had such ability, 
l.,hen he was paying attention, but after his retirement 
this was absent and the Navy ceased to be credible a threat 
as the actions of the belligerents from 19"14-1917 demon-
strated. 
In the absence of such political leadership, the 
Navy's decline may be excused, but it cannot be praised. 
As with many groups in the United States, the Navy was 
concerned more immediately with its own professional-
ization, particularly through the dogma Mahan provided. 
Still the Navy's definition of its mission was limited and 
the failure to heed threats that could not be contained 
easily was less than professional. The military services 
in a democracy cannot be autonomous of the government., but 
in taking the free reins that were available, the Navy was 
not fulfilling its duty to the nation. The national 
interest required more than a second-rank military status 
regardless of the shift in popular opinion in the United 
States that turned away from international interests 
after the burst of empire-building in the ·1890s. 
It should have been clear that the Capital ship 
Strategy was not working, and that it was causing the 
nation to fall further behind. In the New Navy's search 
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for identity and authority, continuity became a higher goal 
than immediate effectiveness. The greatest failure was 
the failure to look for alternatives. Japan, and Italy 
after a fashion, made Sea Power work to advance their 
interests in a combination with mercenary diplomacy. The 
United States did not do so until late. The Navy could 
not have forced an active diplomacy on an unwilling 
executive, but withdrawing into itself was not a justif-
iable response. Another Roosevelt could have used the 
fleet that was built effectively, but failing that all 
the other significant strategic options--guerre de course, 
fortress fleet, or fleet-in-being were available to the 
Navy. The United States had the original lead in submarine 
technology for a modern guerre de course approach. 
Similarly, a small battleship policy could have made the 
coasts completely invulnerable; there were several 
attractive "pocket battleship" designs floating around 
before the First World War. The best strategy of all might 
have been a potent fleet of a half dozen battlecruisers the 
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match for those built by England's ''Splendid Cats", Japan's 
Kangas, or Germany's Derflingers. Any of these options 
would have been superior to the very unreachable ideal that 
was sought. 
World War I demonstrated both the failure of the 
Great Power's battlefleets as strategic deterrents and 
their ineffectiveness as a war-winning force. According 
to Linton F. Brooks in Proceedings' 1987 Prize Essay, 
"[itJ is the business of strategists to hedge against 
similar surprises." The leadership of the United States 
Navy would not hedge after the surprise had been revealed 
in ·1914. Extreme pressure from the Allies and the Execut-
ive was required to force th~ Navy to hedge in 1917; 
indeed, there would not be a thorough rethinking of 
~merican naval strategy until the American battlefleet 
was resting in the mud at Pearl Harbor. 
Unrealized victories always have been a common topic 
for military histories, unrealized defeats have been 
somewhat less so. The rise of American Sea Power in the 
early twentieth century came more from not having to fight 
a naval war, even one of the two wars for which the Navy 
deemed itself prepared, than from the conscious actions of 
any of those key players who justly have become luminaries 
of American naval biography. They mistakenly believed that 
superior weapons were the ultimate determinant of victory, 
an error that has become a common one in modern American 
military history. The Navy's leaders consciously rejected 
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this "materialist'' fallacy, but did not realize that this 
was, in fact, the policy they were executing. There proved 
to be few unpleasant consequences and the peril was not 
mortal, as the United States probably was essentially 
immune to foreign threats. However, the naval policy of 
the United States clearly does not m8rit the praise it has 
received from previous commentators. 
Mahan has come off rather badly in the main body of 
this text, somewhat unjustly. As he wrote enough to cover 
almost any contingency, it seemed proper to judge Mahan by 
his actions rather than just by his writings. Mahan 
certainly did not disavow the simplistic interpretation 
given to his theories. In his career, Mahan launched 
campaigns for the acquisition of the Philippines, against 
the Dreadnought, and always for the expansion of the United 
States Navy. He did complain about the Navy's cruising 
policy, intervene in the internecine struggles over 
re-organization, or start any campaigns for a balanced 
fleet. As Vagts has indicated, it can be doubted whether 
Mahan had a better conscious understanding of his theories 
than did Admiral Tirpitz. However, Mahan also devoted 
himself very actively to popularizing the Navy with the 
American people. Although Mahan did not read Clausewitz 
until late in his life, his work taken as a whole would 
seem to indicate a more advanced understanding of strategy 
than the mere adaptation of the operational focus of Jomini 
as The Influence of Sea Power on History would indicate. 
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Mahan's role as a public figure showed that he had at least 
an intuitive understanding of Clausewitz's 'remarkable 
trinity' of war consisting of political objective, operat-
ional instruments, and popular passions. Moreover, the 
motive behind his theorizing, the transition from sail to 
steam, shows that Mahan was not unaware of the impact of a 
vital fourth element--technology. Mahan's error here, 
demonstrated in his desire to retain predreadnoughts as the 
capital ship, was that he assumed that there had been a 
movement to a new era of technology, not to an era of rapid 
and almost constant technological change. This was an 
insight not widely made until after his death. Mahan's 
faults and errors were numerous and serious, but his 
overall contribution to the United States Navy make him 
worthy of the most exalted position he holds therein. 
The applicability of this study to contemporary 
issues is somewhat limited, for conditions have changed. 
The United States is now Mistress of the Seas, and Great 
Britain, the most successful maritime empire in history, 
used a similar approach, often called a ''Bluewater" strat-
egy. This may be the best approach once hegemony is 
achieved; but a Capital Ship Strategy does not seem 
especially fitting as a means for achieving global command 
of the seas. This would suggest that building a couple of 
aircraft carriers is not an especially prudent step for the 
Russians. It is not, however, clear that being a land 
power, Russia envisions Sea Power in basically the same 
90 
manner that the United States, a maritime power, does. Any 
relevance to the debates over big versus small aircraft 
carriers or high-tech versus low-tech submarines for under 
the Arctic ice would be groping. However, this study 
would appear to indicate that, historically, the prepared-
ness of available ships seems to have had more utility 
than the availability of more ships. 
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American naval historians almost universally have 
praised the military effectiveness of the naval policies of 
the United States in the early Twentieth Cen~ury. Diplo-
matic historians of left-of-center schools, begining with 
William Appleman Williams have criticized the "militarist-
ic .. and "imperialistic" intentions of this policy, but they 
have not questioned its efficiency. Since the late 1960s 
several naval historians have cast serious doubt on Mahan's 
assertion that American naval policy before the Civil War 
was a complete failure. However, historians rarely have 
examined pre-World War I naval policies from a strategic 
viewpoint. Walter Millis probably came the closest in his 
Arms and Men, which is a fine synopsis, but Millis' inter-
est was primarily institutional. 
George T. Davis, Harold and Margret Sprout, and, 
indirectly, Samuel Eliot Morison writing in the 1940s 
essentially defined the interpretation of American dread-
nought policy in the early twentie~h century. The Sprouts 
are noted as the primary Mahanists in American naval 
history, and Margret's article on Mahan in Makers of Modern 
Strategy was largely responsible for his first rehabili-
tation within the Navy after World War II. Their books, 
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The Rise of American Naval Power and Towards a New Order of 
Sea Power, are the Navy's standard introductory texts. 
George T. Davis' A Navy Second to None is a more general 
book, which has generally received less renown. Bernard 
Brodie was generally in accord with the Mahanists with a 
particular advocacy for the new capital ship, the aircraft 
carrier. Morison's contribution was more subtle, he took a 
carefully balanced view of the origins of the modern Navy, 
but his title, The Two Ocean Navy for the semi-official 
history of the Navy in the Second World War, was an open 
and strong endorsement of the Mahanian interpretation of 
American naval history. 
The Mahanian interpretation maintained that the 
gradual expansion of the dreadnought battlefleet was a 
successful part of the continuous process by which the 
post-Mahan Navy rose to global com.mand of the sea. In this 
model Tracy began the battlefleet, the Spanish-American War 
made the United States a naval power, Great Britain was 
forced to grant co-equal status to the United States at the 
Washington Naval Conference, and sometime during World War 
II, the United States became mistress of the seas. This 
argument avoids the virtually non-existent role of the 
American battlefleet in the First World War and undervalued 
the extent to which the unimpaired industrial potential of 
the United States forced England's concessions at the 
Conference. To move into the realm of counterfactual 
argument, strategy is essentially a subject of perceptions, 
the quick victory that most experts predicted before World 
War I would have been extremely inimical to American 
interests and would have posed a threat that the Navy was 
unprepared to contain. Given that the Navy was ineffective 
because of the capital ship dogma, and that American 
advances were the exploitation of seemingly fortuitous 
European weakness then the neat progression of the Mahanian 
school does not provide a satisfactory explanation of this 
period of American naval history. 
Much of the praise for Navy in the 1940s, can be 
attributed, beyond its victory, to its apparent prediction 
of eventual war with Germany, and Japan in the early 
decades of the twentieth century, and its Cassandraish 
attempts to prepare the nation. This point of view is 
particularly apparent in books like Gordon C. O'Gara 
Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy, and 
Outien J. Clinard's The Influence of Japan on American 
Naval Power. The war with Germany seems to have been 
devoid of economic competition as a cause, and there were 
at least some elements of self-fulfilling prophecy in the 
war with Japan. 
Elting E. Morison began a worthy tradition in his 
biography of William S. Sims in 1942. Morison became 
overly sympathetic to Sims, but this book is still the best 
introduction available on American naval history of the 
period. Paolo Coletta, Benjamin Cooling, and Richard 
Spector continued the line of wide-ranging biographies in 
their works on Bradley Fiske, Benjamin F. Tracy and George 
Dewey respectively. In England, Peter Padfield's biography 
of Percy Scott was somewhat general, but Richard Hough 
provide a solid synthesis of the many works on Jackie 
Fisher in his biography. 
The 1950s saw military history turn towdrds institut-
ion"'l studies. Hilliam Braisted works, The United States 
Navy in the Pacific 1897-1909, 1909-1921, broke new ground 
in linking military and foreign policy, which was followed 
by J.A.S. Grenville's extension into war plans. This work 
has been continued brilliantly by Spector, Helger Herwig, 
and Donald Trask. Strictly institutional histories of the 
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Navy began on a negative note with Vincent Davis' Admiral's 
Lobby and Peter Karsten's The Naval Aristocracy. The 
criticism was related to the United States involvement in 
Vietnam, but these books did open up the study of sociolog-
ical factors. James Abrahamson's America Arms for a New 
Century and Richard Challener's Admirals, Generals, and 
American Foreign Policy may be a little uncritical in 
response, but, on the whole, present a much more balanced 
picture. Less broad, but interesting works have included 
Armin Rappaport's The Navy League and Fredrick Harrod's 
Manning the New Navy. 
The Vietnam Era also, and almost paradoxically, 
spawned a buffish fascination with the technology of war. 
Siegfried Breyer, Richard Hough and i.Jilliam Mcf1ahaon 
produced by far the best works of this genre in their works 
1 ·13 
on Dreadnoughts. These fell far short of Oscar Parkes• 
awesome tome British Battleships from Warrior to Vanguard. 
This seemingly insurmountable challenge recently has been 
ansv-Jered by Norman Friedman's impeccable series on American 
design histories. Ivan Musicant, John Reilly, and Robert 
Scheina have supported this endeavor ably on armored 
cruisers and predreadnought battleships. 
William Livezey•s Mahan on Sea Power has remained the 
standard work on Mahan despite its laudatory tone. It 
replaced Captain Puleston's earlier biographer which was 
felt to be overly negative, apparently the least criticism 
was deemed inappropriate. Robert Seager•s biography 
appended to Mahan's letters is an excellent "warts and all" 
approach which does not denigrate Mahan and which hopefully 
will replace Livezey. 
Naval theory sometimes does not appear to have 
advanced at all since Mahan: today's "Maritime Strategy" 
which calls for the Navy to descend immediately upon 
Murmansk and Vladivostok to contain or destroy the Red Navy 
is unadulterated Mahan. Actually, a large amount of 
excellent work has been done. Herbert Rosinski wrote 
several devastating critiques of Imperial German Naval 
Policy in the 1930s. After World War II, Alfred Vagts was 
unrestrained in his contempt for Mahan's inattention to 
combined operations, Henry Eccles was equally effective, 
if more restrained, in noting Mahan's inattention to 
logistics and technology. The best single volume on modern 
11 4 
naval theory is Clark G. Reynolds' Command of the Sea which 
fills in the prophet's sins of ommission and commission. 
Many fine articles can also be found by our current 
generation of strategists in the Naval War College Revie~. 
A definitive history of the United States Navy during 
the battleship era (1880-1921 or 1941) has not yet emerged; 
there is nothing to match Arthur J. Marder's Anatomy of 
British Sea Power and From Dreadnought to the Scapa Flow. 
This can be attributed largely to the lack of major 
controversies in American naval history of the period. The 
Mahanian interpretation of early American naval history has 
produced a major revision spearheaded by Paul Schroder, and 
William Still. Marder had to answer charges that British 
naval policy had unreasonably provoked Germany in the 
still-smoldering question of war-guilt. There has been a 
similar question over American "imperialism" in Latin 
America, but that has not touched the question of overall 
military effectiveness. Whether this question has any more 
than historical interest is debatable, but it may be hoped 
that the "New'' military historians wil.l press their 
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